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THE SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL DISCOVERY
Geidback Transport, Inc. v. Delay, 443 S. W.2d 120 (Mo. 1969)
Seeking to recover possession of its missing tractor, Geldback
Transport brought a replevin action against Delay, a salvage yard
operator, and Grassham Chevrolet, Co. At the time the action was filed,
Grassham was in possession of the tractor, parts of which had been
located by state police in several locations, including Delay's salvage
yard, and had been collected under search warrants for storage with
Grassham. Delay filed a cross-claim against Grassham for actual and
punitive damages, alleging that Grassham was wrongfully interfering
with his "lawful right of possession" by withholding return of the
vehicle. Both the plaintiff, who had since dismissed Delay as a defendant,
and Grassham served interrogatories on Delay seeking information
relative to his initial acquisition of the vehicle. Claiming a privilege from
self-incrimination, Delay refused to answer the interrogatories.' Based
on this refusal, Grassham moved for, and was granted, a dismissal of the
cross-claim. On appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, the trial court's
dismissal was affirmed. Held: If a cross-claimant refuses, on grounds of
self-incrimination, to answer material interrogatories of an opposing
party, the trial court may penalize such exercise by dismissal, with
prejudice, of the cross-claimant's cause of action. 2
The court, adopting a "you can't have the cake and eat it too"
approach, reasoned that a party should not be permitted to seek
affirmative relief in a civil action if unwilling, for whatever reason, to
answer material interrogatories regarding the basis of the claim he put in
issue. The court ruled that, by placing the basis of a claim in issue on his
cross-claim, Delay "waived" any right to exercise the privelege prior to
trial without penalty.3 The court further supported its position by
holding that, notwithstanding any imputed "waiver," a party in the
position of a plaintiff in a civil action has no constitutional right to an
unfettered exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.4
Geldback is not the first Missouri decision to impute a waiver of the
I The Geldback case does not present, therefore, the problem of a party refusing to answer only
certain interrogatories. As regards that problem, see generally Brown v. United States, 356 U.S.
148 (1958); Comment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 1968 U. ILL.
L.I- 75; Note, Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 52 VA. L. REV.
322 (1966).
2 Geldback Transport, Inc. v. Delay, 443 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1969).
3 id at 121-22.
4 Id. at 121.
Washington University Open Scholarship
372 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
self-incrimination privilege in a civil action. As authority for its decision,
Geldback cites Franklin v. Franklin,5 a divorce action wherein plaintiff,
on self-incrimination grounds, refused to answer pertinent
interrogatories concerning her previous marriage. Franklin held that,
while the plaintiff may properly refuse to answer, "her action must be
judged in the same manner and by the same rules as though she had
refused to answer any other pertinent written or oral interrogatories."'
The exercise of her constitutional privilege thus justified imposing a
penalty on her-striking her pleading in this case. Franklin held, in
effect, that by putting certain matters in issue and bringing the action,
the plaintiff waived any right to exercise the privilege free of penalty.
This approach was based on other Missouri cases imputing similar
waivers of evidentiary privileges, such as the patient-physician privilege.7
The distincion between common law or statutory evidentiary
privileges and the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
is, however, apparent. Equation for waiver purposes cannot, therefore,
be made without some conceptual difficulty. Consequently, imputed
waivers have not been uniformly justified in other jurisdictions when
trial court penalties imposed for exercise of the self-incrimination
privilege have been challenged. Several jurisdictions have affirmed the
imposition of a penalty through an "affirmative relief" test. The key
under this test is whether the party claiming the privilege has brought the
questions into issue by asserting a claim or an affirmative defense. If so,
refusal to respond during discovery or at trial invites some form of
sanction by the trial court.8 Other courts have labeled their theory a
"fairness" test, asserting that it is unfair for the privilege to be used as a
"sword" to prevent an opposing party from discovering information
material to his claim or defense.9 Geldback, utilizing both theories
5. 365 Mo. 442,283 S.W.2d 483 (1955).
6. Id. at 447,283 S.W.2d at 486.
7. E.g., State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. 1968) (auto accident claim wherein
plaintiff, though alleging injury, refused to produce medical records at discovery-the privilege was
held to be waived by the assertion of the bodily injury claim); State v. Swinburne, 324 S.W.2d 746
(Mo. 1959) (a criminal case wherein defendant asserted an insanity defense-the privilge against
revealing pertinent information was held to be waived by placing sanity in issue); State ex rel.
Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Cowan, 356 Mo. 674, 203 S.W.2d 407 (1947) (a party seeking court
relief waives any privilege relative to the basis for such relief).
8. E.g., Stockham v. Stockham, 168 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1964); Annest v. Annest, 49 Wash. 2d 62,
298 P.2d 483 (1956).
9. E.g., Independent Prod. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266 (E.D. N.Y. 1958); Christenson
v. Christenson, 281 Minn. 507, 162 N.W.2d 194 (1968); Levine v. Bornstein, 13 Misc. 2d 161, 174
N.Y.S.2d 574 (1958), affd mem.. 7 App. Div. 2d 995, 183 N.Y.S.2d 868, affd mem., 6 N.Y.2d




without distinguishing between them, apparently considered the tests
identical. Although fewer in number, several jurisdictions have decided
discovery-privilege confrontations with what is characterized as a
"balancing" test. As is apparent from the title, this test, unlike either the
"affirmative relief" or "fairness" doctrine, does not lead to automatic
results. Instead, the "balancing" requires a court to measure the
constitutonal value of an unfettered exercise of the privilege against costs
to the opposing parties through their loss of discovery."0
Just as courts have used different tests in deciding who should be
penalized, and when, for exercising the privilege against self-
incrimination, they have empoyed a wide range of sanctions when a
penalty is ruled appropriate: the opposing party has been allowed to
comment on the claimant's use of the privilege;" other courts have
permitted an adverse inference to be drawn by the jury;12 part,13 or all,14
of a party's pleadings have been striken; and, courts have granted
summary judgment upon refusal to answer pertinent questions.'5 While
courts have commonly used dismissal of the party's action with
prejudice as a sanction, at least one court has taken a more moderate
approach, dismissing without prejudice, 6 thereby allowing him to bring
suit on the same cause of action at a later date if changed circumstances
relieve the party from his self-imposed silence.
Geldback merely affirms the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of
Delay's cross-claim. The court's earlier decision, Franklin v. Franklin,
made clear that the cross-claimant's privileged refusal to respond to
interrogatories should be treated in the same manner and by the same
rules as an unprivileged refusal to answer. In this regard, the Missouri
Rules of Civil Procedure permit the trial court wide discretion in the
selection of sanctions to be imposed when a party refuses to answer
pertinent interrogatories. Rule 61.01 (b) provides for the imposition of
such orders as are just if the party refuses to obey a court order to
10. E.g., Laverne v. Laurel Hollow, 18 N.Y.2d 635,219 N.E.2d 294,272 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1966),
appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 682 (1967).
I1. E g., Morris v. McClellan, 154 Ala. 639,45 So. 641 (1908).
12. Eg., Ikeda v. Curtis,43 Wash. 2d 449,261 P.2d 684 (1953).
13 Annest v. Annest, 49 Wash. 2d 62,298 P.2d 483 (1956).
14. Rubenstein v. Kleven, 150 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass. 1957).
15. E.g., Kisting v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Wis. 1968), affd, 416
F 2d 967 (7th Cir. 1969); Bauer v. Stern Furniture Co., 169 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.& 1008 (1969).
16 E.g, Zaczek v. Zaczek, 20 App. Div. 2d 902,249 N.Y.S.2d 490 (194).
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respond at the discovery stage.17 The court may order the disputed
questions to be taken as established in accordance with the claim of the
moving party, strike out part or all of the pleadings, dismiss, render a
default judgment or perhaps do nothing at all. Speaking of this
discretion, the court, in State ex rel. N. W. Electric Power Cooperative v.
Buckstead,18 stated: ". . . the authorization [provided in 61.01 (b)] is not
mandatory, but rather permissive. It says 'may' and does not say 'shall'.
We believe, too, that broad discretion is left to the court .... .", Rule
61.01 (d) states the sanctions that may be imposed for wilful failure to
comply. Its language too is permissive, implying the same "broad
discretion" given the courts in Rule 61.01 (b).20
Franklin's implementation of these discretionary rules, which direct
the trial court to impose such remedies as are "just", suggests that the
court was flirting with a subtle "balancing" test. Geldback, however,
suggests that the court has now decided to follow an automatic dismissal
17. Mo. R. Crv. P. 61.01 (b) provides:
If any party ... refuses to obey any order made under paragraph (a) of this Rule requiring
him to answer designated questions, or an order made under Rule 58 to produce any
document or other thing for inspection, copying or photographing, or to permit it to be done,
or to permit entry upon land or other property, or an order made under Rule 60, requiring
him to submit to a physical or mental examintion, the court may make such orders in regard
to the refusal as are just, and among other the following:
(I) An order that the matters regarding which the questions were asked or the
character or description of the thing or land, or the contents of the paper, or the
physical or mental condition of the party or any other designated facts shall be taken
to be established for the purpose of the action in accordance with the claim of the
party obtaining the order;,
(2) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated
claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated
documents or things or items of testimony, or from introducing evidence of physical
or mental condition;
(3) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the
disobedient party. (Emphasis added)
18. 399 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. App. 1966).
19. Id. at 625. See also In re M - & M - 446 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. App. 1969) which states:
Rule 61.01 (b) is not by its terms mandatory, but discretionary, for it provides that as a
consequence of a party's refusal to obey a discovery order "the court may" (not "shall")
make such orders as are just, including the striking of his pleadings or the rendering of a
judgment against him by default. Whether the court makes or refuses to make such an order
under the rules is within the discretion of the trial court in the first instance. Nevertheless that
discretion must be applied with wisdom and justice.
Id. at 513.
20. The pertinent language states:"... the court on motion and notice may strike out all or any
part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a
judgment by default against that party:' Mo. R. Civ. P. 61.01 (d).
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rule under the "affirmative relief" doctrine. Thus, because the cross-
claim placed Delay in the position of a plaintiff, his voluntary exercise of
the privilege required the trial court to dismiss his claim with prejudice.
The inflexibility of this result for parties in the position of a plaintiff was
apparently thought by the court to follow as the logical reverse of those
cases which have refused to impose any penalty for the exercise of the
privilege by parties in a defensive posture. 2' Those cases have reasoned
that fairness dictates that a party involuntarily brought into a claim
should not be penalized for the exercise of a constitutional privilege.
Several recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that the constitutional
concept of "fairness", due process, mandates that parties in a defensive
posture be allowed to exercise the privilege without hindrance or penalty.
For example, the Court stated in Malloy v. Hogan22 that: "The
fourteenth amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege
that the fifth amendment guarantees against federal infringement-the
right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will and to suffer nopenalty. . . for such
silence."'
The following year, in Griffin v. California,?4 the Court invoked the
"penalty" language from Malloy to justify its decision to overturn a
conviction of murder. During the trial, the failure of the accused to
testify was commented upon by both the prosecuting attorney and the
court in its instructions. The Court held that the fifth amendment
forbids such comment on the refusal to testify in a criminal case. "It is a
penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privlege. It cuts
down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.21
In two cases decided in 1967,21 the Court found the threat of discharge
and the sanction of disbarment to be penalties imposed for exercising the
privilege and remaining silent. In Spevack v. Klein, the Court restated
the Grifin language, explaining that the ". . . penalty is not restricted
to fine or imprisonment. It means, as we said in Griffin v. Californfa, the
imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the fifth
21 See, eg., United States v. Second Nat'1 Bank, 48 F.R.D. 268 (D. N.H. 1969); Abbate v.
Nolan, 228 So. 2d 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Abramorvitz v. Voletsky, 47 Misc.2d 626,262
N.Y.S 2d991 (1965); Barbato v. Tuosto, 38 Misc.2d 823,238 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1963); McKelvey v.
Freeport Housing Auth., 29 Misc2d 140,220 N.Y.S.2d628 (1961).
22 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
23 Id. at 8.
24 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
25 Id. at614.
26 Spevack v. Kelin, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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amendment privilege 'costly'. ' 27 Since it can be argued that the
imposition of any sanction on a valid claim of privilege would be
"costly", the Court could hold unconstitutional any sanctions currently
imposed on any parties who exercise the privilege.
Geldback reasoned, however, that the Supreme Court intended to
decide only those situations presented-that is, defendants in criminal
cases or non-party witnesses, called to testify at the behest of a
governmental agency. Thus, while there is persuasive authority for the
proposition that no penalty can be imposed on a defendant who exercises
his privilege against self-incrimination, courts have used equally
persuasive reasoning, without express Supreme Court contradiction, to
justify the imposition of sanctions on a plaintiff or one who is in the
position of a plaintiff in a civil action. 29 It is, however, a non-sequitur to
reason, as Geldback may seem to imply, that, because a party in the
position of a plaintiff should not be constitutionally protected on his
exercise of the privilege, he should therefore be automatically dismissed
out. In fact neither the "affirmative relief" or "fairness" tests nor the
"balancing" test was designed to determine what penalty should attach
to the exercise, but only whether any penalty is merited. This was the
approach taken by the Missouri Supreme Court in Franklin.
Geldback, however, is based on circumstances which make it
unnecessary to segregate those separate issues. In Geldback, the
appellant cross-claimant was refusing to reveal during the discovery
stage those elements of his case which would have to be revealed at trial
in order to recover. Thus, Delay was claiming only a limited privilege of
silence until trial. This claimed limited privilege seemingly does not call
for the weighing or analysis of interests which Spevack arguably
commands, primarily because an exercise of the privilege in this context
is more an avoidance of discovery than self-incrimination. Delay
27. 385 U.S.511,515 (1967).
28. Geldback Transport, Inc. v. Delay, 443 S.W.2d 120, 121 (Mo. 1969).
29. The reasoning of the New York court in Levine v. Bornslein is representative of that in all
those cases. 13 Misc.2d 161, 174 N.YS.2d 574 (1958). In Levine, plaintiff brought an action on
assigned judgments and defendant sought to develop the affirmative defense of illegality. Plaintiff
refused to answer questions, at a pre-trial examination, pertinent to the defense. In ordering
dismissal of plaintiff's cause of action the court noted that the privilege
* * had always been claimed by a non-party witness or a defendant in court involuntarily,
seeking only to defend. It does not follow that the protection of the privilege should be
expanded to shield a plaintiff who with one hand seeks affirmative relief in court and with the
other refuses to answer otherwise pertinent and proper questions which may have a bearing
upon his right to maintain his action.
13 Misc.2d at 163, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
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eventually had to reveal the information he sougnt to keep secret or else
be subject to a dismissal at the close of his case. This distinction, albeit
unexpressed by the court, explains Geldback's affirmation of an
automatic penalty of dismisal with prejudice. Geldback can be read as a
rejection of the flexible "balancing" test approach for discovery-
privilege confrontations. Closer consideration of the Missouri Supreme
Court's decision, however, suggests that Franklin remains intact. Under
Franklin, unlike Geldback, the trial court in a discovery-privilege
dispute may weigh a large number of factors before selecting the most
appropriate penalty for the privileges exercise. This flexible approach
will best assure a just sanction for the exercise under the wide variety of
circumstances which can occur, and, in addition, leaves room for
consideration of the constitutional origin of the privilege being asserted.
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